“Got Race?” The Production of Haole and the Distortion of Indigeneity in the Rice Decision by Rohrer, Judy
Haole in Hawai‘i is a social assemblage produced in multiple ways
through vectors of power operating in terrains of law, space, time, culture,
history, politics, and representation. One of the dominant contemporary
productions of haole (white people, whiteness) is that of victim, unfairly
discriminated against by state policies that beneﬁt Native Hawaiians
(Känaka Maoli) and by a local culture characterized as “anti-haole.” The
issue of state discrimination or “reverse racism” came to a head with the
Supreme Court decision in Harold F Rice v Benjamin J Cayetano, 528 US
495 (2000), hereafter referred to as Rice. The case was front-page news in
Hawai‘i, and closely watched in the rest of the country as well. Framed by
the dominant discourse (molded by the media, lawyers, politicians, and so
forth), the case appeared to be about Native Hawaiians (asking questions
about who they are and what rights they have), and not about haole
(assuming there are no questions as to who they are and what rights they
have). Yet I contend that the case really was about the haole, since white
subjectivity is constructed through the law as much, and often more, by
what is not said and not regulated than what is. Ultimately, Rice cleared
more space for haole in Hawai‘i by taking it away from Känaka Maoli
through a denial of their legal claims and a disappearing of their extrale-
gal witness and mo‘olelo (stories, histories). 
The Rice case illustrates how Western law renders indigenous claims
inarticulable by racializing native peoples, while simultaneously normaliz-
ing white subjectivity by insisting on a color-blind ideology. The inherent
contradiction in these two positions—race matters /race does not matter—
is played out in the frictions surrounding the Rice decision and is evidence
of the cracks in the hegemony of Western law that complicate any easy
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binary of colonizer–colonized. Using Rice as a case study, I explore how
the Western legal framework is set up to accept the teleological narrative
of development, problematize native identity, and naturalize white sub-
jectivity. I then broaden the lens to explore the ways Rice points to an
epistemological disconnect between Western notions of the production of
knowledge and indigenous articulations of the same.
Harold “Freddy” Rice, a ﬁfth-generation haole, and his lawyer, John
Goemans, ﬁled the lawsuit in 1996. Rice charged that the Hawaiians-only
voting restriction for trustees of the Hawai‘i State Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs (oha) constituted unlawful racial discrimination, in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Federal District Court Judge
David Ezra and the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided against
Rice, ruling that the oha restrictions were based on a special trust rela-
tionship between the Hawaiian people and the state, and therefore did not
constitute racial discrimination. Rice and Goemans appealed to the US
Supreme Court,1 which decided Rice v Cayetano on 23 February 2000.
In a 7–2 ruling, the court held that the Hawaiians-only voting restriction
violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on voting restrictions based on
race. The two dissenting justices were John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
Competing Narratives of Hawaiian History
What lay at the core of the Court’s decision was a battle of
conﬂicting histories. Indeed, justice struggles through claims
of rights are, ﬁrst and foremost, struggles over collective
memory.
—eric k yamamoto and chris k iijima,
“the colonizer’s story”
The Rice case was indeed largely founded on a struggle over collective
memory. Two divergent historical narratives vied for recognition, one
emphasizing colonization and its impacts, and the other highlighting
Americanization and “development.” Within the colonization narrative,
Känaka Maoli have suffered and continue to suffer the devastating
impacts of the illegal overthrow of their nation and US colonization. Jus-
tice requires somehow redressing these wrongs. The Americanization nar-
rative represents the same history through the teleological trope of devel-
opment (in which “development” is assumed to be a natural process) and
the rhetoric of “civilization.” In this section I look ﬁrst at the clashing his-
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torical narratives in Justice Anthony M Kennedy’s opinion and Justice
Stevens’s dissent for what they illuminate regarding the production of
haole. I then turn to Harold Rice’s own narrative for the ways he tries to
place himself comfortably at home in Hawai‘i, mobilizing pieces of both
narratives in a destabilization that highlights the asymmetries of colonial
processes and their narration. 
The ﬁrst paragraph of Justice Stevens’s dissent makes it clear that he
saw the case in terms of conﬂicting histories: 
The Court’s holding today rests largely on the repetition of glittering generali-
ties that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State of
Hawaii. When that history is held up against the manifest purpose of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and against two centuries of this Court’s
federal Indian law, it is clear to me that Hawaii’s election scheme should be
upheld. (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 527–528)
Justice Stevens pointed to some of those “glittering generalities” in his
dissent, including a reinscription of precontact feudalism; the construction
of haole as settlers rather than immigrants; the centering of the plantation
experience and its appropriation in shoring up the discourse of meritoc-
racy in Hawai‘i; and the intimation that Queen Lili‘uokalani was respon-
sible for her own overthrow. The majority decision constructs Hawai‘i’s
history as one of positive Americanization and development brought
about thanks to enterprising haole. In support of this view, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote that his purpose was to “recount events as understood by law-
makers, thus ensuring that we accord proper appreciation to their pur-
poses in adopting the policies and laws at issue” (Rice v Cayetano 2000,
10). His historical account then can only be told through a Western legal
framework. What is spun is “a remarkable narrative, essentially retelling
the favorite American fairy tale of how the white man ‘civilized’ the sav-
age—this time in the context of Hawai‘i” (Iijima 2000, 98).
The haole is the natural agent of Kennedy’s history. Starting with Cap-
tain Cook, the lofty goals of discovery, trade, religious conversion, and
agricultural industry propel haole to the islands. Colonization is misrec-
ognized as primarily the individual acts of enterprising white men, and
the “natural” outcome of an encounter between the so-called civilized and
uncivilized. In a glaring example of constructing and maintaining a nor-
malized status for haole, Americans and Europeans are recognized by
Kennedy as “settlers” (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 501), whereas the “people
of many different races and cultures” who came to work on plantations
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are “immigrants” (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 506). As far as the Court is con-
cerned, immigrants may come from “many different races and cultures,”
but they are not white. Chris Iijima noted: 
There is . . . one group never referred to nor described as an “immigrant”
group. That group is constructed differently from immigrants because through-
out the opinion it is assumed to be the rightful and natural heir to the land of
Hawai‘i. It is not insigniﬁcant that the Court refers to the Tahitians as the ﬁrst
Polynesian settlers of Hawai‘i and consistently also refers to white immigrants
as settlers. This latter group—apparently never immigrants—consists of white
missionaries and other “settlers.” Their descendants are implicitly constructed
in this way as the natural heirs to Hawai‘i. In other words, these “nonimmi-
grants” are the ancestors of Freddy Rice. (2000, 103)
Not only does this reliance on telling a certain story of the immigration
of laborers and the settlement of haole allow for the naturalization of the
haole as leader, but it also sows the seeds of a belief in meritocracy. This
belief is then mobilized against Hawaiians who somehow fail to measure
up to the immigrants who pulled themselves out of the plantations,
through discrimination, and up by their bootstraps. Kennedy wrote,
“Each of these ethnic and national groups has had its own history in
Hawaii, its own struggles with societal and ofﬁcial discrimination, its own
successes, and its own role in creating the present” (Rice v Cayetano 2000,
506). Note how this sentence simultaneously assumes and marks a host
of immigrants as racialized Others.
As Kennedy’s statement indicates, the centering of the plantation nar-
rative as the key to understanding Hawai‘i politics conceals a narrative of
colonization. The statement about (nonwhite) immigration is offered as
background for understanding Hawai‘i’s demographics, the material nec-
essary to construct contemporary Hawai‘i as a multicultural land of har-
mony and equal opportunity. This racial harmony construct in turn
makes “discrimination” against haole look even more odious. 
Intimating that Queen Lili‘uokalani was responsible for her own over-
throw bolsters the narrative of seamless Americanization. Kennedy wrote
that the queen, upon attempting to “promulgate a new constitution restor-
ing monarchical control over the House of Nobles and limiting the fran-
chise to Hawaiian subjects,” was “replaced . . . with a provisional govern-
ment” (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 505). This retelling of events makes the
queen appear undemocratic and obscures the violence of her overthrow.
After brieﬂy noting that President Cleveland opposed the overthrow, Ken-
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nedy wrote simply that “the Queen could not resume her former place,
however, and in 1894, the provisional government established the Repub-
lic of Hawaii. The Queen abdicated her throne a year later” (Rice v Caye-
tano 2000, 505). Since this all appears to have happened in a vacuum, we
are left to assume that Queen Lili‘uokalani was just not up to the task of
ruling. Since she could not rule, it follows that Americans should take
over and lead the islands into democracy.
Justice Stevens’s dissent goes quite a way in deconstructing the Ken-
nedy opinion, opening space for alternative stories, and thereby destabi-
lizing the haole as the normative subject of the law. Stevens was incensed
by what he described as the “wooden” approach of the majority to the
elements in the case (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 547). He chided them for
their lack of understanding of the unique history of Hawai‘i: 
It is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled
to special beneﬁts designed to restore a measure of native self-governance
because they currently lack any vestigial native government—a possibility of
which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them. (Rice v
Cayetano 2000, 535)
Stevens’s dissent continuously refers to native Hawaiians as “indige-
nous” or “aboriginal” and brings colonization back into the picture by
discussing the “history of subjugation at the hands of colonial forces”
(Rice v Cayetano 2000, 529). In this way it disrupts the majority’s devel-
opmental narrative, which comfortably places haole as “natural” leader in
Hawai‘i and turns the oha voting requirements into unfair retribution.
Justice Stevens reminded the Court of the origins of the Ofﬁce of
Hawaiian Affairs and the content of the federal Apology Resolution—two
signiﬁcant legal events that go almost completely without mention in the
majority opinion. He twice pointed out that the ofﬁce itself, as well as the
oha trustee voting requirement, was established by a vote of the entire
electorate of the state (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 544, 546). This undercuts
the claims of “reverse racism” on which the case is built, by making it
harder to construct a disgruntled minority acting with intention to dis-
criminate against the majority. In fact, haole and other non-Hawaiians
voted in the requirements Rice was complaining about. Further, Stevens
found in the 1993 Apology Resolution ample evidence of federal involve-
ment in the overthrow and the need to recognize the federal trust rela-
tionship with native Hawaiians (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 533).
The Apology Resolution (US Public Law 103-150, 28 November 1993)
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was signed into law by President Clinton on the one-hundred-year anni-
versary of the overthrow of the monarchy and is an ofﬁcial apology from
the US federal government to the Hawaiian people.2 Bringing the Apology
back in destabilizes arguments relying on “special rights” rhetoric because
it establishes that, in fact, the federal government does have a “special”
relationship with Native Hawaiians based on their indigenous status and
US involvement in the overthrow of the kingdom. This resonates with Eric
K Yamamoto and Chris K Iijima’s contention about Rice as a struggle for
collective memory (2004). If the violent history and impacts of coloniza-
tion are denied (as the Americanization narrative tries but never com-
pletely succeeds at doing), haole is dehistoricized. If haole is dehistoricized,
any limitations on haole legal subjectivity seem unfair, and thus haole is
cast as a victim of discrimination. In a dehistoricized Hawai‘i, everyone
“naturally” has equal opportunity and equal claim to everything.
Harold Rice’s historical narrative is far less seamless than Kennedy’s
and far less critical than Stevens’s. In an interview with Naomi Sodetani,
Rice wore his contradiction on his sleeve, smuggling colonization back in,
however unwittingly. Rice’s statements exemplify the uneven quality of
colonial processes creating unpredictable convergences, conﬂicts, and dis-
connects between and within variant subjectivities. Proud of his (male)
ancestors, he spoke at length about how they supported the monarchy.
He claimed that his great-grandfather, H P Baldwin, was against the over-
throw and that his great-great-grandfather, William Hyde Rice, “was a
good friend of (King) Kaläkaua, and helped him to write the Bayonet Con-
stitution” (Sodetani 2003). (Rice seemed oblivious to the impossibility of
Kaläkaua writing a constitution that was forced on him through threat
of violence.) He further reported that his great-great-great-grandfather,
William Harrison Rice, gave up his American citizenship, “pledged his
loyalty to the king and became a Hawaiian citizen” (Sodetani 2003).
Rice proudly asserted that, given this history, Hawaiian activist Keanu
Sai told him that he was a Hawaiian citizen (since his ancestors never
relinquished their Hawaiian citizenship), and therefore he had no stand-
ing to sue the state. He seemed to like this determination, claiming that
“if I had to make a choice, a citizen of U.S. or citizen of Hawai‘i, I’d never
think twice, I’d be a citizen of Hawai‘i” (Sodetani 2003). The statement
is not disingenuous. It is clear from his interviews that he is quite knowl-
edgeable about, acculturated to, and supportive of Hawaiian culture.
More cultural hybrid than straight haole, his aesthetics are local / Hawai-
ian, yet ﬁltered through a US constitutional framework.
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Ann Laura Stoler’s work on the processes of colonization helps put
Rice’s autobiography into a larger context. While her writing is mainly
about European colonization, some elements are comparable to US pro-
cesses. Stoler, like Anne McClintock (1995), Sally Engle Merry (2000),
James Clifford (1997), and others, is critical of a methodology that
assumes a ﬁxed polarity between “colonizer” and “colonized” where the
colonizer has complete power and control. Stoler has argued that “colo-
nialism was not a secure bourgeois project. It was not only about the
importation of middle-class sensibilities to the colonies, but about the
making of them” (1995, 99; emphasis in original). “Cultural competen-
cies” and “sexual prescriptions” were continually altered in attempts to
maximize proﬁt and stabilize colonial rule (Stoler 1995, 113). New sub-
jectivities are made and others remade through colonial processes that
destabilize a neat colonizer–colonized binary. Harold Rice is material
evidence.
Take the example of a challenge from Lilikalä Kame‘eleihiwa about
how it is that Rice is ﬁfth-generation and there was no intermarriage with
Känaka Maoli until the generation of his children (Kame‘eleihiwa and
Spivak 2003). Kame‘eleihiwa attributed this to racism, and yet we know
that haole “sexual prescriptions” during those ﬁve generations varied
widely enough to make any easy attribution of cause difﬁcult. There cer-
tainly was a discourse of the “eugenic peril,” as Stoler called it (1995, 181),
of blood mixing circulated primarily by missionaries in the ﬁrst decades
after contact in an attempt to stem the high rate of sexual intercourse
between haole men and Hawaiian women. This discourse faded in light
of an increasing incidence of intermarriage, especially to ali‘i (chiefs, roy-
alty)—motivated in varying degrees by a desire to inherit land and gain
political power. Here sexual prescriptions get remodeled and bright racial
divisions get blurred. Where Rice’s ancestors stood with regard to those
dynamic discourses is difﬁcult to assay without intensive historical
research; furthermore it is doubtful they all had the same take on the
matter. 
Rice has reconciled his dissonant positions—Hawaiian national versus
champion of US constitutional rights—through an articulation of aloha
for the Hawaiian people. In a statement that parodies itself Rice avowed,
“I wish the best for the Hawaiians. If anything, I’m pro-Hawaiian. . . .
most of my friends are Hawaiian” (Sodetani 2003). He has asserted that
he is playing a positive role in history, following in the footsteps of his
ancestors (his language reminds me of the “tough love” rhetoric in circu-
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lation in the 1980s). Talking about the case, he said, “It was good for
Hawaiians, and certainly good for the state. Got everybody thinking.
Hawaiians took advantage of being able to play the part of victim and get
entitlements based on race. They stepped over the line. The Rice decision
made everyone step back” (Sodetani 2003). Through this patronizing
framework, Rice’s statements echo the Americanization narrative of
Hawaiian history. Regardless of the overthrow (which his great-granddad
opposed), Hawaiians ought to be treated like everyone else and ought to
act like everyone else (“everyone else” measured by the naturalized haole
standard). The palpable material and psychological impacts of coloniza-
tion are nothing more than Hawaiians “playing the part of victim.” The
Hawaiian Kingdom functions on the level of nostalgia for him; it has no
real relevance anymore. 
Rice’s cultural hybridization makes it difﬁcult for him to ignore
Hawai‘i’s history of colonization. He attempts to ﬁnd ways to fold that
history into the Americanization narrative that triumphed through Ken-
nedy’s retelling in the Supreme Court decision. In Kennedy’s story, haole
were courageous settlers who built a meritocracy, democracy, and racial
paradise out of a repressive monarchy. Even while his case made use of
this easy narrative, Rice’s family history destabilizes it; it breaks down the
colonizer–colonized duality and opens space for the question of Native
Hawaiian collective identity.
Native Hawaiian Collective Identity
Identities are the names we give the different ways we are
positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives
of the past. 
—stuart hall, quoted in 
Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference
The bloody mess of who counts as Hawaiian is fraught with
histories of contested entitlement and colonial dispossession.
Hawaiian racial deﬁnitions have been thoroughly bound-up
with struggles over land and identity.
j ke¯haulani kauanui,
Rehabilitating the Native
One of the key controversies in the Rice case involved multiple, often
conﬂicting, deﬁnitions of Native Hawaiian collective identity, including
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“race,” “tribe,” “Hawaiian nationals,” “wards of the state,” “political
entity,” and “indigenous peoples.” These identity deﬁnitions are fashioned
through discourses of blood, ancestry, history, legal documentation, and
culture. The knot only became more tangled in the course of the case: Rice
argued race; the state argued anything but race (including “tribe-like”);
the majority contended ancestry was proxy for race; the minority argued
ancestry (decoupled from race) and indigeneity—and Kanaka Maoli inde-
pendence activists were forced to watch from the sidelines. No one in the
courtroom represented them and many of their arguments fell outside
legal discourse anyway. 
The key thread to follow in unraveling the controversy over Kanaka
Maoli identity and opening up an understanding of how haole is normal-
ized in the process is the race thread. The case was framed around race
and ultimately decided on grounds of racial discrimination, requiring that
we descend into what Kauanui called the “bloody mess” of the racializa-
tion and deracination of Hawaiian identity (2000, 11). Two main strands
running through Kanaka Maoli racialization are made visible in Rice: the
violence of the imposition of a Western legal racial identity on an indige-
nous people in a colonial process; and the speciﬁc use of blood quantum
measurements to contain and control identiﬁcation. 
Precontact Känaka Maoli did not think in terms of race,3 and certainly
never asked to be “raced” (this is the crux of the argument against using
the Western racial label of “native Hawaiian”). Virginia R Dominguez
wrote a fascinating article about the US obsession with racial taxonomy,
especially as evidenced through the census and its imposition on Hawai‘i
(1998). She indicated that King Kaläkaua was interested in trying to
understand US practices of racial categorization but never adopted them,
continuing to use nationality (which had been adopted by previous ali‘i)
as the premier system of population classiﬁcation: 
So the nonadoption of racial taxonomy may not have been accidental. What
we do know for sure is that “race” and “color” remained elusive as principles
of classiﬁcation and modes of reference at least into the 1880s. Everything
changed the minute the United States annexed Hawai‘i in 1898. The very next
census—of 1900—blatantly classiﬁed the population by “color.” (Dominguez
1998)
Dominguez went on to track the mapping of racial categories onto
Hawai‘i’s people by continental bureaucrats for whom Hawai‘i was “just
one more place to adapt, recategorize and incorporate within the racial
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taxonomy [of the US government],” no matter how ill-ﬁtting that taxon-
omy might be. She traced how US census categories have ﬂuctuated with
changing political, social, legal, and scientiﬁc positions, and how that has
meant a proliferation and splitting of categories for racialized “others,”
while maintaining the “naturalness and unfragmentability of ‘whites’”
(Dominguez 1998). In Hawai‘i, this overlay at the point of annexation
meant that, all of a sudden, “white” was a “natural” category by ofﬁcial
standards (one of the few categories that literally counted), whereas
“Hawaiian” did not even appear in the taxonomy.
One of the ways haole racialized Känaka Maoli even before the ofﬁcial
importation of racial taxonomy was through representation, ﬁrst as some-
times noble but deﬁnitely savage, then as inherently lazy and infantilized,
and from the 1920s until the recent backlash, as unfortunate victims
deserving government charity, which also meant regulation through gov-
ernment bureaucracies. These representations fed the legal categorization
of Känaka Maoli. Haunani-Kay Trask wrote, “Who we believe ourselves
to be is often not what the colonial legal system deﬁnes us to be. This dis-
junction causes a kind of suffering nearly impossible to end without end-
ing the colonial deﬁnitions of who we are” (1993, 135). A primary goal
of decolonization, then, is (re)discovering community-based deﬁnitions of
one’s group and trying to make a place for them in neo- or post-colonial
societies.
Rona Tamiko Halualani has written about the violent and delimiting
nature of legal colonial deﬁnitions imposed on an indigenous population.
She sees law and governance as “violent technologies of struggle and
identiﬁcation that exceed the textuality of identity representations. Legal
deﬁnitions of identity, for instance, are activated and supported by mili-
tarization, courts of law, and state administrations and result in material
consequences like the denial of indigenous identiﬁcation for cultural rights
and entitlements (land, beneﬁts) and racial (mis)recognition as a means to
negate one’s formal claim to indigeneity” (2002, 38). Many Kanaka Maoli
scholars mark the establishment of the technology of blood quantum as a
measurement of Hawaiianness in 1920 as pivotal in the legal racialization
of Hawaiians—a textbook example of the violence of colonial identities. 
Turning now to the issue of blood quantum for Native Hawaiian iden-
tity, I analyze the history of blood measurement for Hawaiians, how this
ﬁts with Native American experience, Justice Kennedy’s assertion that
ancestry is “proxy for race,” and documentation requirements. Blood
rohrer • the production of haole in the RICE decision 11
quantum measurements were instituted through the 1920 federal Hawai-
ian Homes Commission Act (hhca). In effect these rules have contained
and controlled Kanaka Maoli identiﬁcation and simultaneously trans-
ferred power and property to haole. The deﬁnitions set up in this act and
brought forward in subsequent laws played a critical role in the major-
ity’s decision in Rice.
J Këhaulani Kauanui has done the most work on blood quantum and
has painstakingly laid out how the racialization and deracination of
Känaka Maoli via blood is intricately and insidiously tied to the ongoing
project of colonization. The hhca hearings, Kauanui pointed out,
showed a shift from consideration of Hawaiian entitlements to a bureau-
cratized concern with “rehabilitation” that constructed Hawaiians as a
racialized beneﬁciary class, at the same time as it protected white property
interests. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was the ﬁrst to institute
a blood quantum system of classiﬁcation for Känaka Maoli, setting up a
category called “native Hawaiian” consisting of those with 50 percent or
more blood traceable to pre-1778 inhabitants. Eligibility for approxi-
mately 200,000 acres of ceded land set aside by the act for “Hawaiian
homesteads” was based on this classiﬁcation, which became the legal stan-
dard of Hawaiian identity for both federal and state policy. As Kauanui
argued, “The blood quantum policy is racist because it works to redeﬁne
Hawaiian identity from a genealogical link to the land to a mathematical
fraction. It also works towards the end of lowering the numbers of
‘authentic’ Hawaiians, and thus dispossessing other Hawaiians from the
land bases entitled” (2000, 53–54). Similarly, Trask wrote, “Imposed sys-
tems of identiﬁcation are instituted to separate our people from our lands
and from each other in perpetuity . . . the white people who created our
classiﬁcation hoped that Hawaiians of 50 percent or more blood quan-
tum would eventually die out, thus leaving our lands and revenues not to
Hawaiians of less than 50 percent blood but to the state and federal gov-
ernments” (1993, 135).
The blood quantum standard did violence by redeﬁning Hawaiian
identity as separate from genealogy, fortifying the myth of the vanishing
Hawaiian, and insuring that property continued to accumulate in the
hands of haole. It also ﬁrmly established the haole as the normative citi-
zen in Hawai‘i—and this was decades prior to statehood. Through the
processes of deracination, the closer the Hawaiian subject was to the
haole, that is, the more her blood had been whitened, the more assimi-
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lated or ”civilized” she was assumed to be, and therefore the greater her
potential for citizenship. On the other hand, those who were at least half
Hawaiian were considered almost helplessly backward and often, para-
doxically, in need of saving through the rehabilitative magic of homestead-
ing. “The less Hawaiian one is, the more competent, capable, assimilable,
and citizen-like she or he is, which in turn regrids a position of normative
whiteness ironically through the articulation of a part /mixed Hawaiian
identity in the hhca hearings” (Halualani 2002, 72).
Kauanui discussed the way Hawai‘i legal processes and discourses have
triangulated the inassimilable Asian “outsider” with the whitened (and
therefore dispossessed) Hawaiian, and the unquestioned, normative haole.
She cautioned against “selective assimilation,” which confers “franchise
rather than sovereign recognition” (Kauanui 2000, 78). Native American
scholar David Wilkins also pointed to the problems with forced inclusion
for Native Americans: “While most racial /ethnic groups and women
faced a forced exclusion from the American social contract, Indians, from
the 1880s, faced a forced inclusion into the American polity. However, it
was an inconsistent and ambivalent inclusion at best. Most of the actions
by federal policymakers from the nineteenth century to the 1970s were
aimed at ‘Americanizing’ and ‘civilizing’ Indians” (2002, 192; emphasis
in original).
Along similar lines, Native American scholar Eve Marie Garroutte, in
her insightful book Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native Amer-
ica (2003), laid out the mineﬁelds, contradictions, and varying conse-
quences of navigating legal deﬁnitions of Native American identity. She
quoted Jack Forbes on the reversal of hypodescent for natives,4 quipping
that modern Americans “are always ﬁnding ‘blacks’ (even if they look
rather un-African), and . . . are always losing ‘Indians’” (Garroutte 2003,
48). A policy of forced inclusion, no matter how ambivalent, can “vanish”
native peoples in a literal whitewash; their claims are thereby silenced or
made illegitimate. If there are no “real” Indians or Hawaiians, there can
be no obligations toward them, no claims from them.
The assumption of high blood quanta for native peoples was made evi-
dent in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Rice. The Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs required voters either be “native Hawaiian,” as deﬁned by 50 per-
cent blood, or “Hawaiian,” a broader category forged after the Hawai-
ian Homes Commission Act to include anyone with pre-1778 ancestry
(usually eligible for fewer beneﬁts). Breyer found the state’s deﬁnition of
“Hawaiian” too broad to be “reasonable” because it could include some-
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one with less than one ﬁve-hundredth original Hawaiian blood (assum-
ing nine generations since 1778). In his concurrence he wrote: 
There must . . . be some limit on what is reasonable, at least when a State
(which is not itself a tribe) creates the deﬁnition. And to deﬁne that member-
ship in terms of 1 possible ancestor out of 500, thereby creating a vast and
unknowable body of potential members—leaving some combination of luck
and interest to determine which potential members become actual voters—goes
well beyond any reasonable limit. (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 527)
For Breyer, it seemed obvious that the class was too broad. No “rea-
sonable” person would consider someone with such “diluted” blood to
actually be Hawaiian. Their Hawaiianness, he claimed, would be based
on “luck” (disqualiﬁed for being arbitrary) and “interest” (disqualiﬁed
for being antidemocratic). He presumed “that genealogy is the arbitrary
modality of identity when it would seem that blood quantum is not only
arbitrary, it is abstract and restrictive” (Kauanui 2002, 119). Breyer
argued that he was “unable to ﬁnd any Native American tribal deﬁnition
that is so broad” (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 526)—but he must not have
looked very hard. 
Garroutte wrote that while two-thirds of Native American tribes use
blood quantum in their deﬁnitions for membership, the remaining one-
third use other requirements often requiring some sort of lineal decent, but
also criteria based on residency, community participation, vote, parental
enrollment, and the maintenance of annual contact (2003, 15). The Cher-
okee, for example, have no blood requirement at all. Tribal membership
is open to any who can show a “legal-historical relationship” to the tribe
through an ancestor listed on the Dawes Rolls.5
Garroutte told the story of Cherokee tribal member and registrar, R Lee
Fleming, registering a girl who was 1/2048 Cherokee. Fleming talked
about how the Cherokee Nation is now on its third constitution—none of
which has had a blood requirement. He emphasized that it is the “legal-
historical relationship” between member and tribe that is important.
“People might ﬁnd this standard surprising if they don’t understand the
whole context of how it was created, and our tribe’s history. But our rea-
sons for crafting it were sound reasons, reasons that come from who we
are as people” (Fleming quoted in Garroutte 2003, 33). Many Hawaiian
activists, including Jonathan Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio and J Këhaulani
Kauanui, echo Fleming’s sentiment. “If being a descendant of a Native
makes one Native, what if anything does blood quantum have to do with
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who we are?” (Osorio 2001, 361). “Blood quanta classiﬁcations have con-
sistently been used to enact, substantiate, and then disguise the further
appropriation of native lands while they obscure and erase a discourse of
speciﬁcally Hawaiian sovereignty and identity as a relation of genealogy
to place” (Kauanui 2002, 110).
The hhca deﬁnition of native Hawaiian was carried forward,
amended, and rearticulated in subsequent legislation, including the state’s
Admission Act and the 1978 amendment to the state constitution that cre-
ated the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs. Looking back on this legal history,
the majority in the Rice decision was able to ﬁnd multiple instances where
“race,” “ancestry,” and “peoples” were used seemingly interchangeably
to deﬁne Hawaiians and native Hawaiians. The majority exploited this
untidiness, afﬁrmatively answering the question, “Got race?” In perhaps
the most destructive and controversial statement in the Rice decision, Ken-
nedy wrote, “Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here” (Rice
v Cayetano 2000, 514). Thus, ancestry was easily dismissed as nothing
more than a cover for racial difference. Kauanui countered: 
It is not that the state is using ancestry as a proxy for a race; it is that blood
quantum inherently mobilizes racial categories as a proxy for ancestry. For
many Hawaiians, what this case highlights is the necessity for insistently artic-
ulating discourses of genealogy, with their attendant notions of responsibility
to place and to descendants, as a basis of Hawaiian discourse of sovereignty.
(2002, 120; emphasis mine) 
It was through the imposition of blood quantum percentages that
Hawaiians were legally racialized and severed from identity claims based
on the more ﬂuid concepts of genealogy. Kennedy’s statement is so
destructive because it causes the historical processes of racializing Hawai-
ians via blood quantum to disappear, and then denies the materializations
of those processes. Rice can be read as evidence of the white historical
amnesia that “races” a people, forgets it raced them, and then denies the
material impact of that racialization when it becomes the ground on which
that people begin to make claims. Halualani talked about this amnesia
with regard to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act when she wrote,
“Blood and its seemingly objective markings could specify difference in the
same moment it wiped away the structured dispossession of Hawaiians,
a process of historical forgetting that is achieved just as a moral claim of
rehabilitation emerges. By this logic, blood economizes land allotments in
line with citizenship” (2002, 63).
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In the Rice case, race as proxy for ancestry is taken from simply “econ-
omizing” Hawaiian rights to invalidating them. No longer does it seem
permissible, even for those who can document their 50 percent blood to
the authorities, to claim state or federal entitlements. Any claims to a
“special relationship” or “trust” are trumped by the race card, in this case
played against racialized neocolonial subjects unable to give indigeneity
or aboriginality weight on the (color-blind) scales of justice.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, strongly objected to Kennedy’s claim that
ancestry was a stand-in for race. While he admitted that this might some-
times be the case, he was steadfast that it was not in this instance: 
The distinction between ancestry and race is more than simply one of plain lan-
guage. The ability to trace one’s ancestry to a particular progenitor at a single
distant point in time may convey no information about one’s own apparent or
acknowledged race today. Neither does it of necessity imply one’s own iden-
tiﬁcation with a particular race, or the exclusion of any others “on account of
race.” The terms manifestly carry distinct meanings. (Rice v Cayetano 2000,
539)
Stevens was careful to use the language of “indigenous status” or “abo-
riginal people,” yet he did not address race as a ﬁction of colonization.
He continued within a framework that assumes that race is an objectively
knowable, pre-political, “natural” attribute.
Another signiﬁcant aspect of the use of blood quantum for Hawaiian
entitlements is that it has put Hawaiians in a situation of having to legally
document their identities (so well described by Halualani in the third
chapter of her 2002 book). This is an incredibly fraught position for many,
not just because of the violence of having to “prove” themselves to the
state, but also because of all the ways it reintensiﬁes the violence of col-
onization. First of all, traditional Kanaka Maoli culture was oral, not
written. As bell hooks reminded us, “The burden of proof weighs heavily
on the hearts of those who do not have written documentation, who rely
on oral testimony passed from generation to generation. Within a white
supremacist culture, to be without documentation is to be without a legit-
imate history. In the culture of forgetfulness, memory alone has no mean-
ing” (1992, 193). Second, when written records started being kept, the
processes were extremely haphazard, random, and biased. Missionaries
were the ﬁrst to keep records and they had their own ideas about racial
taxonomy—and, as Dominguez has illustrated, even the dominant tax-
onomy was in ﬂux. Birth certiﬁcates misclassiﬁed parents, only listed one
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racial category when they were multiple, or only listed a category for one
parent. Names were frequently misspelled. Records were often lost or
destroyed in ﬁres. Third, the bureaucracy that now exists and is putting
records into an electronic database is completely overwhelmed, prone to
frequent error, and very hard to navigate. Some have made it their life’s
project to try and document their family’s history. Some cannot even talk
about it, it is so painful. 
Hawaiian interviewees walk us through the painful, private memories of locat-
ing identity documents. They reconcile the writing over of their names and
raced identities, tragically reducing family genealogies to blood veriﬁcation.
Hawaiians also negotiate competing versions of their histories as told by fam-
ily members versus what the formal documents reify as the concrete truth.
(Halualani 2002, 83)
Again, this is a situation shared by many Native Americans who have
to document their blood for tribal, federal, or state law. Many are resent-
ful of having to “prove” their identities when there is no such requirement
for any other racial group. One of Garroutte’s interviewees said with
tongue-in-cheek that he is enrolled in the Ojibwe tribe and is also “part
white, but I don’t have the papers to prove it” (Garroutte 2003, 29).
Neither do haole have “papers to prove it.” Haole are never asked to
document their identities in order to claim space in Hawai‘i and have
never experienced the structural violence of racialization (this is substan-
tially different than being culturally marked as haole, even when this
marking leads to violence). The Rice case was about eliminating any
beneﬁt that might come from having documentation of a Hawaiian
identity. 
Color-blind Ideology and Naturalizing the Haole
The Rice decision was perhaps the ﬁrst time that the Fifteenth
Amendment has ever been invoked to protect the rights of a
white male.
—Eric K Yamamoto and Chris K Iijima,
“The Colonizer’s Story”
The Supreme Court found that the oha voting regulations violated the
Fifteenth Amendment guarantee that the right to vote would not be
“denied or abridged” on account of race. The majority based its decision
on a color-blind reading of the law that ignored institutional, historical,
and racial inequality (including racialization and inequality produced by
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the law itself) in order to construct the myth of an “equal playing ﬁeld”
or meritocracy. Color-blind legal analysis thus served to reinscribe institu-
tionalized racial inequalities and hierarchies, including white power and
privilege, by pretending they do not exist, by being “blind” to them.6 In
an important article establishing the connection between whiteness and
property, Cheryl Harris wrote, “Colorblindness is a form of race subor-
dination in that it denies the historical context of white domination and
Black subordination. This idea of race recasts privileges attendant to
whiteness as legitimate race identity under ‘neutral’ colorblind principles”
(1993, 1768–1769). I would expand “Black” to encompass all nonwhite
racializations, since color-blind ideology is applied to other racialized
groups as well, though in very different ways. 
Color-blind ideology emerged over the most recent “post–civil rights”
decades as part of the conservative backlash against political claims and
assertions by people of color, particularly those focusing on afﬁrmative
action. “Thus, at the very historical moment that race is infused with a
perspective that reshapes it, through race-conscious remediation, into a
potential weapon against subordination, ofﬁcial rules articulated in law
deny that race matters” (Harris 1993, 1768). Charles Gallagher’s study of
white racial formation corresponds with this assertion. It highlights the
inﬂuence of legal thinking in racial formation and the reactionary move
to imagining whiteness as a “liability” that drives color-blind ideologues:
“The racially charged and politically conservative environment of the late
1980s and 1990s has reinterpreted whiteness as a liability. The cultural
mythology that has become today’s commonsense understanding of race
relations is a deﬁnition of society that is colorblind. The ascendancy of
color blindness as the dominant mode of race thinking and the emergence
of liberal individualism as a source of white entitlement and racial back-
lash was a central ﬁnding in my work” (Gallagher 1997, 9). The law,
according to this ideology, has become too color positive; it has made
race matter. This perception drives the notion that white people are being
disadvantaged, and therefore the law must be reigned in to a “neutral,”
color-blind state.
Employing a Foucauldian analysis of the shift to a color-blind racial dis-
course illuminates how this discourse can seem both new and renewed at
the same time. Similar to the shift between the discourses of a “symbolics
of blood” and an “analytics of sexuality,” in the discourse of “colorblind”
racism there are “overlappings, interactions and echoes” (Foucault 1978,
149) of the discourse of “color” racism. To maintain the racist status quo,
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the rhetoric needed to shift from one where color is relevant to one where
it is not, but the former continues to “haunt” the latter. Stoler is interested
in Foucault’s analytic concern with the “tension between rupture and
reinscription, between break and recuperation in discursive formations”
(Stoler 1995, 61). She wrote, “What concerns him is not modern racism’s
break with earlier forms, but rather the discursive bricolage whereby an
older discourse of race is ‘recovered,’ ‘modiﬁed,’ ‘encased,’ and ‘encrusted’
in new forms” (Stoler 1995, 61). We might think of color-blind ideology
as a “new,” “encrusted” form of racism.
Two speciﬁc examples of this color-blind ideology at work are the
related matters of Justice Kennedy’s calling Harold Rice “Hawaiian” and
Rice’s calling himself “Hawaiian at heart.” Both of these incidents high-
light the friction between an empty, disconnected, color-blind ideology and
local island culture’s racial and ethnic embeddedness. Kennedy stirred up
a huge controversy by matter-of-factly declaring early in his decision that
Rice was “a citizen of Hawaii and thus himself a Hawaiian in a well-
accepted sense of the term” (Rice v Cayetano 2000, 499). One assumes
that the declaration that Rice is Hawaiian followed from the practice of
naming people by their states, regions, or cities of residence, (eg, someone
who lives in California is a Californian; in the Midwest, a Midwesterner;
in New York, a New Yorker). These are geographic and cultural signiﬁers
more than anything else. This system breaks down in Hawai‘i because a
“Hawaiian” is not a residential category, but a racialized, indigenous
identity.
No one in Hawai‘i, not even the conservative Honolulu Advertiser or
Harold Rice,7 could concur that it is “well-accepted” to consider a haole
a Hawaiian. The statement only served to illustrate the enormous gap
between Kennedy’s ignorant presumption and the reality of social rela-
tions and histories in the islands. Far from being color-blind, Hawai‘i
could be called color-cognizant. Racialized ethnic discourse is intrinsic to
local culture, not primarily as a foundation for discrimination or inter-
group conﬂict, but more in recognition of the different histories and
cultures that come together in the islands. To impose on Hawai‘i a dis-
course that is “blind” to these histories and these distinctions, a discourse
that gives everyone equal claim to being “Hawaiian,” is itself a haole
act—the product of a foreign culture and ideology, an act of ignorance
and arrogance.
While Harold Rice is perceptive enough to not deem himself “Hawai-
ian,” he does feel comfortable with the “Hawaiian at heart” label (Rolo
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1999). In fact, in an interview with Anna Loomis, he credited his Hawai-
ianness for the relative lack of backlash against him: “I think one of the
reasons that I was able to come out popular in the Rice v Cayetano case
is that I grew up with Hawaiian cowboys, and played with their kids. . . .
And even today, half the people I associate with are Hawaiian. . . . And so
my body language and my . . . what I exude out to the public is, um . . .
not anti-Hawaiian” (Loomis 2001, 17). Here, as in the Sodetani inter-
view, he struggled to represent himself as anything but an “anti-Hawai-
ian” haole. In this statement, he seemed almost to want to say that he
“exudes” Hawaiian, but he pulls himself back. 
Because it is so important to Rice to not be seen as “anti-Hawaiian,”
he strongly holds to a discourse in which justice and merit are color-blind.
In this framework, he can be against “discrimination” but not against
Hawaiians. “The case was not about oha, was not about Hawaiians, it
was about discrimination in the voting box. Just happened to be oha.
And the people who know me, and any Hawaiian that talks to me knows
that. Just instinctively they know that I’m not against them” (Loomis
2001, 17). Rice hopes people instinctively know he is “pro-Hawaiian” or
“Hawaiian at heart.” It frustrates him to think otherwise. Just as he used
Keanu Sai’s statement to legitimize his standing as a Hawaiian national,
he used interactions with other Hawaiians to show how Hawaiian, how
not-haole, he is. He told a story about an old Hawaiian woman who was
mad at him over the case. He claimed that her comment was: “Well,
Freddy, at least it wasn’t some haole that did this!” (Loomis 2001, 17).
Following color-blind logic, Rice believes Hawaiians should not get
special entitlements: “Hawaiians are just as capable as anybody of doing
well in today’s world. They have the intelligence and ability and the
advantage of this being their home, so they don’t need the help” (Sodetani
2003). According to Rice, Hawaiians have not been disadvantaged by
colonialism. In a bitterly ironic twist, he contended that Hawaiians actu-
ally have the advantage because they are at “home”—a home his ances-
tors and other haole have controlled for over a century. And then, in an
essentializing gesture that goes even further, he stated, “Frankly, I’ve
never run into a Hawaiian who wasn’t smarter and more capable than
me. I sort of kid that’s why us haoles have to push and work so hard—
we don’t have the talent. I mean, if I could play music and sing like these
Hawaiians, I wouldn’t have to be so pushy, I’d be more happy, content”
(Sodetani 2003).
Rice’s comments reveal contradictions rooted in his having grown up
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in Hawai‘i. He somehow wants to acknowledge indigeneity (Hawaiians
being “at home”), while at the same time erasing colonization and declar-
ing a level playing ﬁeld with a home team advantage. He wants to be a
Hawaiian national based on his ancestry but not to recognize a Hawai-
ian nation with claims against the US government. He wants to be seen
as supporting Hawaiian language and culture at the same time his case
opens up challenges to programs that do just that. Rice’s paradoxical
positioning highlights the dehistoricizing of color-blind ideology, which
enables white subjectivities to be normalized while indigenous articula-
tions of subjectivity fail to be recognized at all. 
Western Legal Discursive Framework and 
Inarticulable Positionings
Haole residents presumed their absolute natural right to
Hawai‘i by practicing their legal and citizen rights from
“home.” In so doing, private (white) sovereign residency was
normalized while a Hawaiian subject position was racially
marked and structured existing through its constructed differ-
ence: signs of prehuman, non-Christian ways, and the absence
of a capitalist system of land production.
—Rona Tamiko Halualani,
In the Name of Hawaiians
The inability of the courts to hear arguments that do not conform to a
Western legal framework is undeniably evident in Kennedy’s dramatic
closing statement in Rice:
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by a history
beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down through generations;
and their dismay may be shared by many members of the larger community.
As the State of Hawaii attempts to address these realities, it must, as always,
seek the political consensus that begins with a sense of shared purpose. One of
the necessary beginning points is this principle: The Constitution of the United
States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Hawaii. (Rice v Caye-
tano 2000, 524; emphasis mine)
This statement is problematic on so many levels: history is reduced to
a fate overpowering hopeless primitives; the impacts of colonization are
reduced to “dismay”; justice is twisted into “political consensus”; and
“shared purpose,” which is the apparent remedy to the “dismay,” is sup-
posed to come from a constitution written centuries ago by nonindige-
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nous men in another nation, on a remote continent. Kennedy’s statement
elides any question of Kanaka Maoli indigenous identity, neatly capturing
them as citizens of the United States bestowed with the esteemed “her-
itage” of the US Constitution. It is to this heritage, not the constitutions
of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i or their own culture and genealogies, that
Känaka Maoli are patronizingly advised to turn. 
In this section I ﬁrst turn to the Mashpee trial, perhaps the most famous
example of indigeneity on trial, for the light it sheds on Rice. The Mash-
pee’s desire to ﬁnd a way to claim resources and recognition through the
law leads me to a discussion of the Native Hawaiian Recognition Bill
(known as the “Akaka bill” after Daniel Akaka, one of Hawai‘i’s senators
proposed the legislation) as a direct response to the Rice case driven by
fear over a loss of resources. The Akaka bill highlights the tension between
those Känaka Maoli who hope to ﬁnd recognition and protection in US
law, and those who want nothing to do with it.8 The Mashpee case and
the Akaka bill, along with Rice, further illustrate the ways in which legal
discourse renders indigenous people’s identities, histories, and epistemolo-
gies unrecognizable. In the last half of this section I explore indigenous
articulations outside and beyond Western law. Indigenous articulations of
identity and epistemology are necessary to a critique of modernity (includ-
ing whiteness), although that critique is not their main purpose.
It is useful to look at the infamous 1976 Mashpee case as a similar
instance of indigeneity on trial while whiteness consolidates power behind
the scenes. In this case, the self-identiﬁed Mashpee ﬁled suit in federal
court for possession of land they argued had been wrongly transferred to
the Cape Cod town of Mashpee under the 1790 Indian Nonintercourse
Act. The suit made non-Indian residents nervous, as the 16,000 acres in
question constituted about three-quarters of the town (Garroutte 2003,
61). Lawyers for the town charged that the Mashpee were not a tribe and
therefore had no claim. It seems the Mashpee could call themselves any-
thing they wanted until it started interfering with property. The differences
from Rice are signiﬁcant. The Mashpee were proactively trying to use the
law, whereas the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs (which represented the state
and not Känaka Maoli) was defensively trying to protect itself against the
law. The Mashpee were trying to ﬁnd a way into the box labeled “tribe,”
whereas oha and many Känaka Maoli were trying to ﬁnd a way out of
the box labeled “race.”
The similarity of the cases is that both required an indigenous popula-
tion to deﬁne itself in western legal discourse in order to accrue beneﬁts
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from a Western judicial system. “In order for the state to hear their claims
. . . these Indians were forced to speak in a formalized idiom of the lan-
guage of the state—the idiom of legal discourse” (Torres and Milun 1990,
628). So the Mashpee tried very hard to look like a “tribe,” while oha
tried very hard to make Känaka Maoli not look like a “race.” It was the
fuzziness of those terms, and the strictures of the legal discourse that dis-
allowed better-ﬁtting self-originating concepts, that proved the downfall
of the Mashpee and oha. Ironically, one of the ways oha tried to buck
“race” was to argue “tribe,” to the consternation of many Känaka Maoli
who did not want anything to do with either categorization.
The Mashpee trial degenerated quickly into a battle over cultural
authenticity, as the all-white jury settled on culture as the deﬁning ingre-
dient of Indianness. Lawyers for the town successfully convinced the jury
that one was either Indian or one was not and that, given the evidence of
assimilation by the Mashpee (miscegenation and adoption of American
cultural practices), they surely were not. Martha Minnow (quoted in
Iijima 2000, n4), Cheryl Harris (1993, 1764–1766), James Clifford (1988,
277–346), Eve Marie Garroutte (2003, 61–81), Michael J Shapiro (2002,
35–36), and Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun (1990) all regard this case
as key in demonstrating the law’s inability to allow for the “negotiated,”
“mutable,” “historical” quality of identity. “The tragedy of power was
manifest in the legally mute and invisible culture of those Mashpee Indi-
ans who stood before the court trying to prove that they existed” (Torres
and Milun 1990, 649).
The paradox highlighted by Rice is that, while many Hawaiians believe
they need to reject or move beyond government programs or monies pro-
vided based on their racialization, the specter of Rice threatens to take
away that racialization, and thus governmental programs or grants based
on it, before other structures are in place. Kauanui has expressed the con-
cern that “in light of the legal logic in the Rice case, which reduces Hawai-
ians to ‘equal’ American citizens, it may seem necessary to hold onto any
and all marks of distinction, no matter how tainted by colonial relations”
(2000, 6). Similarly, Osorio has warned that Rice “could initiate a trend
to divest the Känaka Maoli of entitlements that, at this point, represent
one of the few hedges against massive poverty and homelessness” (2002,
254). Osorio’s book makes it strikingly clear that Western law is unable
to deal with the sovereignty of indigenous peoples—and yet, because of
the power of the law, indigenous peoples (including himself) continue to
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struggle with the tension between wanting to reject the law and wanting
to be recognized and protected by it, like the Mashpee. 
It is just this tension that has come to a head in the struggle over the
Akaka bill, which was a direct result of the Rice decision. In brief, the
Akaka bill purports to shore up government funding for Hawaiian pro-
grams by establishing some limited federal recognition of a vaguely
deﬁned Hawaiian “sovereign entity.” Those who wholeheartedly support
the bill, including the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs, tout it as granting the
sovereignty Känaka Maoli have been ﬁghting for. Those who stand
adamantly opposed argue that it is just “another form of genocide,” a
sort of deal-with-the-devil because it forces Hawaiians into an extremely
compromised relationship with the US government similar to that of
Native Americans. Many Hawaiians position themselves somewhere in
between these positions. Some acknowledge the limits and dangers of the
bill, but believe it can serve as a stopgap measure. What is clear is that
the bill keeps the discussion of Hawaiian identity squarely within a West-
ern legal framework. Kauanui, who opposes the bill, has advocated a dif-
ferent path entirely: “For many Hawaiians, Rice v Cayetano makes it all
too clear that the discursive apparatus of liberal citizenship, equality, and
‘race’ cannot address issues of collective inheritance and native title.
Attention must now turn, insistently, to non-racialized discourses of
genealogy, with their attendant notions of responsibility to place and
descendants” (2000, 189). If Känaka Maoli, like the Mashpee, were ren-
dered “mute and invisible” by legal discourse, they can be seen, and
heard, surﬁng other discursive oceans.
Inarticulable Positionings and 
Moves Beyond Western Law
What many indigenous peoples are struggling for is explicitly not civil
rights as citizens of the colonizing nation, nor the federally determined
tribal rights of recognized Native American nations. Yet if westerners can-
not place them in these boxes, we have difﬁculty knowing where to put
them. Perhaps it is our failure to acknowledge the particular colonial his-
tories of indigenous peoples that are nearly, but not quite, subsumed
within our nations. The Rice case, Mashpee trial, and Akaka bill in differ-
ent ways illuminate the power of the law and legal discourse to seduce
indigenous people into trying to bend and fold their subjectivities to ﬁt in
24 the contemporary pacific • 18:1 (2006)
a ﬂattened, rigid slot rather than pursue Kauanui’s “non-racialized dis-
courses of genealogy.”
Colin Perrin’s work helps us understand a piece of the dynamic by illu-
minating a problem of recognition particular to the indigenous Other. In
a 1995 article he described the particular anxiety of the nonindigenous in
deﬁning indigenous peoples as citizens of both an indigenous and modern
nation. They represent “an otherness which can never be,” an “ambiva-
lent in-between” because of the “undecidability of their place and time”
(Perrin 1995, 57, 66). Perrin wrote, “Indigenous peoples attest less to a for-
mative and exclusionary violence of modernity and the nation, and more
to its failure. They evoke the memory of ‘something that never ceases to
be forgotten’ and as such their insistence is, at the same time, an insistence
of the postcolonial: the dislocated expression of a colonialism which can
neither be remembered nor forgotten; the paralyzed and anxious persis-
tence of an excess which cannot quite be consigned to the past” (1995,
74). As Perrin suggested, the problem is one of historical memory of col-
onization, but it is more than that. It is temporal and spatial, and as many
are now arguing, epistemological.
In an article about teaching in Aotearoa New Zealand, Alison Jones
described resistance from Päkehä (white) students to admitting the “pos-
sibility of margins to their knowing” (2001, 286). Jones, who is Päkehä,
often team-teaches with a Mäori instructor. She has found that the Mäori
teacher is often treated as a “native informant” who is expected to
“colour-in” the whole picture for the Päkehä so that they then can feel
they have “absolute knowledge” (Jones 2001, 284). Jones posed the
question: “Do we have a cultural incapacity to recognize that we assume
we can know (everything)?” (2001, 288). She suggested instead that we
must allow for “the possibility of not-knowing, of non-mastery” (Jones
2001, 289). Yet this is decidedly not a possibility within many Western
discourses; the Mashpee and Känaka Maoli make this clear in the case
of legal discourse, and many other scholars following a Foucauldian tra-
dition have similarly exposed this quality of medical and academic dis-
courses.
Let us turn for a moment from the struggle of the West to understand
or “place” indigeneity, to what indigenous scholars have to say about their
epistemologies and politics. Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred has artic-
ulated a distrust of Western law similar to that of Kauanui, including a
suspicion of the Western concept of sovereignty. He wrote, “The chal-
lenge for indigenous peoples in building appropriate post-colonial gov-
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erning systems is to disconnect the notion of sovereignty from its west-
ern, legal roots and to transform it” (Alfred 2001, 28). People must
reconnect and create relationships to land, culture, and community, not
follow Western notions of rights, blood, and status. The tools of struggle,
the tools for reconnection, he has argued, are rooted in one’s own culture.
Too many indigenous peoples are, in his words, “like tumbleweeds,” eas-
ily manipulated by the dominant culture (Alfred 2003).
Similarly, Garroutte’s book ends with a call for a “radical indigenism,”
which is more about practice, relationship, and traditional knowledge
than strict deﬁnitions or legal documentation. She has argued, “In our
communities we already possess the resources to meet the challenges of
identity that confront us, and to do so without damaging those commu-
nities” (Garroutte 2003, 143). Native Hawaiian scholar Noenoe Silva has
articulated a related position with regard to Känaka Maoli: “to fully
recover, we have to go beyond the nation and nationalism, which are,
after all, constructs of the West. We must recuperate a deﬁnition of ‘lähui’
that will truly provide for Kanaka control over the ‘äina [land], and that
will give birth to social and political institutions that are good for us”
(Silva 1999, 209).
Walter Mignolo called these articulations “border thinking from the
perspective of epistemological subalternity” (2000, 9). Citing examples
from Gloria Anzaldúa, Vine Deloria Jr, and Rigoberta Menchu, among
others, he analyzed how they make explicit the “tension between hege-
monic epistemology with emphasis on denotation and truth, and subal-
tern epistemologies with emphasis on performance and transformation”
(Mignolo 2000, 26).
Mignolo invoked Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy, the union
of “erudite knowledge and local memories,” as helpful toward concep-
tualizing the tension between disciplinary and subaltern knowledges.
Genealogies, Foucault wrote, “entertain the claims to attention of local,
discontinuous, disqualiﬁed, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of
a unitary body of theory which would ﬁlter, hierarchise and order them
in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what con-
stitutes a science and its objects” (1980, 83). One of the limits of Fou-
cault’s genealogy, in contrast with Mignolo’s “border thinking,” is that it
is predicated on a struggle between “local, discontinuous, disqualiﬁed,
illegitimate knowledges” and scientiﬁc knowledge. It assumes a contest.
“Genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical
knowledges from subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition
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and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and
scientiﬁc discourse” (Foucault 1980, 85). But, what if these knowledges
are not about “opposition and struggle”; what if they exist irrespective of
Western positivistic scientiﬁc discourse, not necessarily in competition
with it? What if, as Osorio has suggested, indigenous discourse and per-
formance simply enable an internal communication and discussion?
This limitation of Foucault’s model comes from not being able to grasp
the difference or “excess” of indigeneity that Perrin has described. Indige-
nous knowledges may be “subaltern,” but they are subaltern with a dif-
ference, a difference tied to colonization. Stoler criticized Foucault for
“short-circuiting empire”: “colonialism was clearly outside Foucault’s
analytic concern, to him a byproduct of Europe’s internal and permanent
state of war with itself, not formative of those conﬂicts” (1995, 28).
Mignolo wrote that he wants to “avoid a Eurocentric critique of Euro-
centrism” because postmodern theories are “blind to colonial difference.
They are blind not to colonialism, of course, as an object of study, but to
the epistemic colonial difference and the emergence of border thinking as
a new epistemological . . . dimension” (Mignolo 2000, 37–38). It is “colo-
nial difference” that is a blind spot for Foucault, Justice Kennedy, and
Harold Rice. And it is border epistemologies, emerging from the “wounds
of colonial histories, memories, and experiences” (Mignolo 2000, 37),
that will transcend colonial difference: 
The transcending of the colonial difference can only be done from a perspec-
tive of subalternity, from decolonization, and, therefore, from a new episte-
mological terrain where border thinking works . . . border thinking can only
be such from a subaltern perspective, never from a territorial one. . . . Border
thinking from a territorial perspective becomes a machine of appropriation of
the colonial differe/a/nces [sic]; the colonial difference as an object of study
rather than as an epistemic potential. Border thinking from the perspective of
subalternity is a machine for intellectual decolonization. (Mignolo 2000, 43)
Kennedy’s decision sought to deny colonial difference, to whitewash
Hawai‘i’s history with a developmental narrative that centers the haole.
The Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs struggles to ﬁnd a way to capture colonial
difference in Western legal discourse. Rice seeks to romanticize colonial
difference as the source of essentialized, depoliticized intelligence, happi-
ness, and petriﬁed cultural tradition. All of these moves normalize haole
subjectivity by problematizing, assimilating, or exoticizing Kanaka Maoli
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subjectivity, and ignoring the fundamental meaning of colonial differ-
ence. For those of us trained in Western thinking, refusing to recognize
the “margins of our own knowing”—trying to capture, categorize, con-
tain, know, and even become Känaka Maoli—simply reproduces haole.
Notes
1 It is signiﬁcant that the lawsuit received signiﬁcant support from the right-
wing Campaign for a Color-Blind America (Rees 1999).
2 The text of the law is quite strong. Its declaration reads: 
The Congress -
(1) on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the illegal overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893, acknowledges the historical signiﬁ-
cance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the inherent sover-
eignty of the Native Hawaiian people;
(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State
of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians;
(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United
States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with
the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the depriva-
tion of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination;
(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramiﬁcations of the over-
throw of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for
reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and
(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the
ramiﬁcations of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support rec-
onciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people. 
3 The word lähui is often translated as “race” by scholars, but assuming an
easy equivalence is but one example of the violence of translation. Lähui had and
has many meanings including “nation” and “people.” It came to stand in for
“race” when that Western concept was imported (Silva 2003).
4 Hypodescent—also known as the “one drop rule”—legally classiﬁes any-
one with “one drop” or more of black “blood” as black.
5 The Dawes Rolls were taken between 1899–1906 by federal commission-
ers and are themselves problematic because of the inconsistent way those who
applied for the rolls were denied or accepted and because many actively resisted
registration (Garroutte 2003, 20–22). See also Sturm 2002.
6 I cannot use the metaphor of “blindness” to signify unknowing without
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noting its ablest assumptions. I do not intend to reify constructions of disability
as lack or incompletion. I use it here because of the preexisting terminology of
“color-blindness.”
7 The Advertiser responded to Kennedy’s claim in a 2 March 2000 editorial
with the retort “Well-accepted where? Certainly not in Hawaii.”
8 For more background on the Akaka bill, please see “Precarious Positions:
Native Hawaiians and US Federal Recognition” (Kauanui 2005).
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Abstract
This paper is part of a larger project that explores haole (white people, foreign-
ers) as a colonial form of whiteness in Hawai‘i—as a dynamic social assemblage.
Haole was forged and reforged in over two centuries of colonization, and it must
be understood through that history. I use the recent Supreme Court decision in
Harold F Rice v Benjamin J Cayetano, 528 US 495 (2000), as an entry point into
the interrogation of haole. Framed by the dominant discourse, the case appeared
to be about Native Hawaiians (asking questions about who they are and what
rights they have), and not about haole (assuming there are no questions as to
who they are and what rights they have). 
The Rice case illustrates how Western law renders indigenous claims inartic-
ulable by racializing native peoples, while simultaneously normalizing white sub-
jectivity by insisting on a color-blind ideology. The inherent contradiction in these
two positions—race matters /race does not matter—is played out in the frictions
surrounding the Rice decision and is evidence of the cracks in the hegemony of
Western law that complicate any easy binary of colonizer–colonized. Through
an analysis of Rice, I explore how the Western legal framework is set up to
accept the teleological narrative of the development, to problematize native iden-
tity, and to naturalize white subjectivity. I then broaden the lens to explore the
ways Rice points to an epistemological disconnect between Western notions of
the production of knowledge and indigenous articulations of the same.
keywords: indigeneity, whiteness, colonization, Hawai‘i, law, critical race
theory
